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Faculty Ethics in Law School:
Shirking, Capture, and "The Matrix"
JEFFREY L. HARRISON*
INTRODUCTION
Recently, a colleague of mine said, fairly bluntly, that she thought
another colleague's tenure file was weak but that she would not oppose him
for fear of offending mutual friends. Only two things distinguish my friend
from many other law professors. First, she was willing to express the fact
that she was allowing her own social comfort to trump her obligation to
make a decision based on the merits of the candidate's work.' Second, she
did not begin to "see" the work as actually "very good" as a way of
avoiding the dissonance created by the conflict between her professional
obligations and personal needs.
This behavior should force us to think about the hazards of faculty
governance of law schools more generally. The primary focus of this essay
is the ethical dimension of the decisions faculty governance requires law
professors to make. These decisions are ethical ones because they often
involve, as did my friend's tenure-decision vote, a personal/professional
tension.
This essay is devoted to the proposition that conditions are ideal for
most law schools to be governed for the benefit of the faculty at the
expense of the welfare of students and others (stakeholders) 3 who expect to
be served by the law school. If this practice is sufficiently broad that it
becomes a component of the institution's norms, two concepts from
administrative law become relevant. One is "self-regulation" and the other
is "capture." The analysis is presented in four steps. In the following
section, the concepts of shirking and capture are explained more fully.
Since no employees, including law professors, are expected to devote
100% of their energy to the institution, one issue that must be addressed is
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law.
Thanks to Professor Amy Mashburn, Dean Patrick Shannon, and Sarah Harrison for
comments.
1. This would be among the "Good Practices" suggested by the American
Association of Law Schools. See infra text accompanying notes 5-8.
2. Maybe the most concise definition is that offered by Professor Dale Whitman:
"ethical means we do the right thing even when it is contrary to our perceived self-interest."
Dale Whitman, Doing the Right Thing, AALS NEWSLETrER (Ass'N AM. LAW SCH.), Apr.
2002, at 1-3, available at http:// www.aals.org/pmapr02.html.
3. For further discussion of stakeholders see infra Section I.B.
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what constitutes shirking. This section also suggests that faculty shirking,
if it occurs, stems primarily from a lack of respect for those whom the law
school serves.
Section II addresses the second step. Having described shirking and
capture in the law school context, the issue is whether law schools are
susceptible to this behavior. An argument is made that law schools are
uniquely vulnerable to shirking and capture. In Section III, anecdotal 4 as
well as some empirical evidence is offered suggesting that shirking and
capture are not merely possible, but do occur. In fact, law schools have
entered into an era of expensive self-promotion which is itself shirking,
encourages faculty shirking, and may conceal institution-wide shirking. In
many respects, this behavior may be consistent with evolving social trends
in which image is more valued than reality. Finally, a proposal is made to
increase the accountability and transparency of law school decision-making
by exposing it to what I identify as "stakeholders."
Before beginning this discussion, it bears noting that the ethics of law
professors has been addressed by others. In fact, in 1989, an American
Association of Law Schools Committee issued an advisory document
entitled "Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge
of Their Ethical and Professional Responsibilities., 5  The guidelines
addressed issues ranging from dating students to methods of
acknowledging the work of others in scholarship. Although the guidelines
address a faculty member's obligations to his or her law school, university,
and to the general public, the wording is too general6 at times to be of much
use. At other times, however, the guidelines can be useful if relied upon.
For example, in an instance like the tenure vote described at the outset, the
guidelines call for independent judgment in voting and caution against
applying pressures on others to vote one way or another except by
"persuasion on the merits."7 In addition, evaluations of colleagues are to
be "based exclusively upon appropriate academic and service criteria."' In
general, however, the impression one has of the Statement is that it was
indeed written by a committee and the result of compromise.
Issues of law professor ethics have also been addressed in the
literature.9 In these instances, the emphasis seems to be on footnote use,'0
4. The anecdotes are all based on true incidents. I have not identified the schools or
people involved because the objective is not to cause embarrassment but to develop a larger
theory.
5. See http://www.aals.org/ethic.html (last visited May 4, 2005).
6. For example, "Individual professors have a responsibility to assume a fair share
of... leadership." Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. For a general discussion see NEIL W. HAMILTON, ACADEMIC ETiucs - PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND SHARED GOVERNANCE (2002). See also
Paul T. Hayden, Professional Conflicts of Interest and "Good Practices" in Legal
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plagiarism," faculty-student relationships,12 peer review,' 3 and disclosure
of alliances that may affect views expressed in scholarship.14 The issues
have not been framed in terms of faculty shirking or the more general
matter of whether law schools are vulnerable to faculty capture.
Finally, it is easy to say that faculty should act "ethically," but
difficult to say what that means. The problem can be understood by
thinking about what economists call a "utility function." This is all the
things and their trade-offs that result in a sense of well-being. Needless to
say, it would be virtually impossible for a law professor's utility function to
be completely consistent with the interests of his or her institution.15 After
all, no one expects law professors to sacrifice all things, including family
time, leisure, etc., simply to advance the interests of the school. Where is
the line at which a law professor begins to put self-interest ahead of
institutional interests to the point that the issue of ethics arises? This is one
of the issues that must be addressed in an effort to assess faculty
governance.
I. SHIRKING, CAPTURE, AND LAW SCHOOLS
A. Shirking Generally
Most readers are already familiar with the shirking or principal-agent
problem even if they do not know it by any of its labels. A simple example
is helpful. Suppose a homeowner lists a house for sale for $200,000 and
agrees to pay an agent 6% of the final selling price. The homeowner's net
will be the selling price minus 6%. Here, the homeowner's interest is in
the highest selling price possible. To that end, the homeowner's preference
is that the broker make all possible efforts, including expensive ones, to sell
the house for the best possible price. The broker's concerns are different.
The broker's net is 6% of the selling price minus the costs of making the
sale. The broker's interest can be maximized by both increasing the selling
Education, 50 J. LEG. ED. 358 (2000); Neil W. Hamilton, The Ethics of Peer Review in the
Academic and Legal Professions, 42 S. TEX. L. REv. 227 (2001) [hereinafter The Ethics of
Peer Review].
10. Arthur D. Austin, Footnote Skulduggery and Other Bad Habits, 44 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1009 (1990).
11. Lisa G. Lerman, Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting,
and Authorship, 42 S. TEXAS L. REv. 467 (2001); Bill L. Williamson, Using Students: The
Effects of Faculty Use of a Student's Work Product, 26 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1029 (1994).
12. Caroline Forell, What's Wrong With Faculty-Student Sex? The Law School
Context, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1997), Jerome W.D. Stokes & D. Frank Vinik, Consensual
Sexual Relations Between Faculty and Students in Higher Education, 96 EDUC. L. REP. 899
(1995).
13. See The Ethics of Peer Review, supra note 9.
14. See Hayden, supra note 9.
15. For a discussion of the utility function of judges, see Richard A. Posner, What Do
Judges Maximize (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Cr. EcoN. REv. 1 (1993).
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price and minimizing the costs of making the sale. Thus, while the
homeowner will never be worse off and will likely be better off as a result
of the broker's efforts, the broker's extra efforts can make the broker worse
off. There is an obvious tension.
This conflict of interests between principals and agents is pervasive.
For example, an employer who pays employees a salary or an hourly wage
is benefited by maximum effort. The employee's interest, on the other
hand, is in attempting to maximize the difference between the effort and
disutility of that effort (unpleasantness) and the pleasures the salary or
wage can buy. There is no hard and fast line that describes when one's
activity edges over the line into shirking. In the case of the hourly
employee, it is not shirking not to work as hard as possible. In fact, in most
instances in which shirking is an issue, there will be activities that fit
squarely into the shirking category and some that are clearly not shirking
and others that fall in between. At bottom, however, all shirking issues can
be seen as ethical questions in that they put the actor to the test of balancing
self-regarding interests against the interests of others.
B. The Parties
When examining the issue in the context of law schools, it is
important to define the relevant parties and their relationship. If one
accepts the premise that law schools do not exist to serve the ends of
faculty, then those who finance the operation of a law school are the most
obvious principals. Here the term "stakeholders" is used to convey the idea
that these are the people who are responsible for the continued existence of
a law school and whose interests are served by a law school. In the case of
private schools in which students pay the bulk of the expenses of the
school, it seems pretty clear that the principal stakeholders are current and
former students - especially, in the case of the later, those contributing to
the endowment of the school. The general public could also be included by
virtue of any favorable tax treatment. Hardly anyone would argue that the
objective students seek in paying tuition is to advance the welfare of
faculty as an end in itself.
On the other hand, publicly supported institutions typically exist to
produce "public goods." These are goods or services that would not be
produced by the private sector because those producing the goods would
not be able to internalize the gains from that production. Under this
interpretation, faculty and students may both become means to the end of
enhancing public welfare. Here the stakeholders are taxpayers,
contributors and, depending on tuition levels, students. The first two
groups may not have an expectation of direct gain. In fact, they may have
more general goals like the "greater justice" or "equal justice." One may
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quibble about why public law schools exist, but it seems irrefutable that
one of the reasons is not to "enhance the welfare of the faculty.,
1 6
C. Shirking at School
Given the categories of faculty and stakeholders, it is possible to begin
developing general rules of what constitutes shirking. There are two
approaches one might adopt, both of which are related to defining what
constitutes "good faith" in the context of contractual obligations and the
process of gap-filling.' 7 Most on point are contracts that involve "best
efforts" or some other flexible standard of performance.18 An important
element of good faith or best efforts agreements or understandings is that
they involve an element of trust. That is, since the precise actions of the
parties cannot be defined, each party is required at least to operate as
though it trusts the other not to take advantage. One §good measure of good
faith is what the parties' reasonable expectations are.'
One approach to determining reasonable expectations is to think about
what the parties would have agreed to had they considered the specific
behavior at hand. There are two perspectives to take. The first is primarily
economic and "sees" the parties as negotiating over specific contract terms.
This imaginary process in the context of a law professor could be quite
bizarre. As an example, suppose at the time of bargaining with a new
faculty member about the terms of her hiring, she asks: "May I take
personal friendship into account in making tenure decisions?" The answer
from the stakeholder might be "no, unless you accept a lower salary since
that type of activity lowers your value to the institution." Now the question
becomes who places a higher value on the "right" to allow personal
friendships to enter into the equation. In effect, the faculty member could
be seen as compensating the stakeholders, by virtue of a lower salary, for
the right to not be as single-mindedly focused on the stakeholders' interests
as possible. If the value to the faculty member of allowing friendships to
16. The rationale of public support of legal education is not always clear. Public
support is generally necessary when the market does not produce something in sufficient
qualities. This occurs when producers are unable to internalize the benefits of their efforts.
Lawyers for the most part attempt to internalize the benefits of their efforts. On the other
hand, the appropriate level of legal services may be different from the amount reflected in
market demand. If so, the subsidization of legal education is one way - along with
subsidizing the payment for legal services - to address this need.
17. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 201-15 (Aspen Publishers 4th
ed. 2004).
18. Contracts professors are familiar with the issue from cases like Empire Gas Co. v.
Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988), and Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454
F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
19. See generally Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369 (1980); Steven J. Burton, Good Faith
Performance of a Contract within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA REv.
1(1981).
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count is higher than the obligation to stick to professional merit is to the
stakeholder, the imaginary contract will permit faculty to have that
discretion.
The economic approach to gap-filling can be very useful, but there is
something discomforting about applying standards to parties about which
they did not agree. In addition, the approach becomes unwieldy when
applied to conduct that is not defined in distinct increments. For example,
consider again the negotiation between the law professor and principal in
the context of favoring friends. How would one measure the level of
"personal prerogative" rights the professor purchased by virtue of a lower
salary, and how would one assess whether the professor has already
"spent" the amount purchased?
A second and better perspective in light of the trust element that exists
between faculty and stakeholders, is to invoke a modified version of
Rawls' "veil of ignorance. 2 °  The question would be what types of
behavior would be viewed as acceptable by the parties if, at the time of
contracting, they did not know whether they would be a stakeholders or
faculty members. The obvious critical element of the veil of ignorance is
that it literally forces one to treat others the way they would like to be
treated. Another attractive element of the veil is that neither party can take
advantage of imbalances in information or in bargaining power. This may
actually reflect the relationship of most law professors to stakeholders. For
while it is clear that some law professors have significant bargaining power
in relation to deans and faculty, it is not clear that stakeholders would ever
view one law professor as significantly more valuable than many others.
Invoking the veil puts the question more in the realm of what people
regard as "fair" in terms of expectations. Having determined what is fair
behind the veil, deviations from that behavior once the veil is lifted are
forms of shirking. More importantly, those deviations reveal a lack of
respect for stakeholders because they indicate that stakeholders were only
worthy of greater consideration when it was possible that professors could
have been stakeholders. This lack of respect means that institutional
resources are used to further interests other than those that would be
furthered if professors actually did place the interests of stakeholders first.
The principal/agent problem in the context of law schools and law
faculties may take a variety of forms, but it all comes back to slippage
between the goals of those who provide support for the school and those
who are paid to achieve those ends.2 1 Shirking is not always and, with law
professors, may rarely take the form of simply loafing. The example at the
outset of this essay is one manifestation. Other standard examples are:
20. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press of Harv. Univ. Press
1971).
21. This duty to stakeholders can be seen as arising from a social contract that permits
self-regulation in exchange for observation of professional standards. See The Ethics of
Peer Review, supra note 9, at 229.
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1. Mailing letters and parcels by express mail at school expense when
there is no rush;
2. requesting school money for travel to a conference that is mainly a
vacation;
3. teaching with less rigor and less effectively in order to avoid low
teaching evaluations;
22
4. voting on appointments and tenure matters in order to increase
one's social or political comfort;
5. using one's position as a law professor to promote personal political
views or to discourage students from voicing disagreement;
6. offering courses that are interesting to the professors but of limited
use to students; and
7. allowing the shirking of others to go on without challenge23 as a
way to avoid personal discomfort.24
I assume most would agree that all of the above involve an abuse of
the trust relationship between professors and stakeholders. Just to be sure,
however, I conducted an unscientific survey in which I asked stakeholders
their views on each of the matters listed above.2' The results, as set out in
22. Teaching in an especially heavy-handed way that is also ineffective because it
"feels good" is also a possibility. For a discussion of "weak teaching," see Ronald H.
Silverman, Weak Law Teaching, Adam Smith and a New Model of Merit Pay, 9 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267 (2000).
23. The AALS "Good Practices" Statement does not directly address the responsibility
of a professor who observes the unethical conduct of another law professor acting in that
capacity. It does, however, indicate that law professors "should... adhere to the Code or
Rules of Professional Conduct of the state bars to which the law professor may belong."
See supra note 5. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility is very clear on the issue
of reporting the misconduct of others:
(a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate
professional authority.
(b) A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of
judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office shall
inform the appropriate authority.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2003). In addition, the "Good Practices"
Statement seems to incorporate by reference the Statement of Professional Ethics of the
American Association of University Professors ("AAUP"). Under general AAUP
guidelines, there appears to be a duty to "take the initiative to inquire about or to protest
against apparently unethical conduct" when a professor reasonably believes another faculty
member has violated professional standards. See The Ethics of Peer Review, supra note 9,
at 245-46 (citing Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, On the Duty of Faculty Members to Speak
Out on Misconduct, 84 ACADEME 58 (1998)).
24. This list could be expanded to include too much consulting, misuse of secretaries,
and a number of other practices.
25. Using a "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" with a numerical range of one to
five, the questionnaire was as follows. The average scores are in parentheses after each
2005]
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the footnote strongly suggest that my initial impression is correct and that
most stakeholders would regard these as more or less bedrock violations of
the trust relationship that necessarily exists between professors and
stakeholders. Granted, the subjects of the questionnaire were not behind
the veil of ignorance and, thus, knew that they were not law professors, but
the results do confirm what, I think, most readers including law professors
would expect.
To be sure, some of the items here seem fairly petty. On the other
hand, voting to hire personal or political friends or to grant them life-time
employment has enormous implications as do pushing a particular political
philosophy or avoiding teaching courses that are most useful to students.
Although I have noted that these are not the same as typical loafing, there is
in fact, a close similarity. The loafer does not give the stakeholder his or
her full effort. The shirker gives the stakeholder less than expected also by
substituting personal interests.
In general, one can see these shirking possibilities as being of various
types. First, some of it is highly individualized and generally unconnected
to the institution. These might include missing class without rescheduling
or using secretaries for personal matters. In another context, this might be
comparable to stealing towels from a hotel. These might be called "petty
crimes" and, although inappropriate, at low levels they are probably not of
great concern. Others have greater institutional implications because they
directly affect the functioning of the school. These would include
individualized instances of voting for friends, insisting on teaching courses
that are primarily of interest to the professor, and using one's position to
stifle debate.
question. The sample size was sixty individuals, nearly all of whom seemed incredulous
that these questions needed to be asked.
I am interested in your opinion about the activities of law professors at a state- supported
law school. Below are ten statements. Please check the box that best indicates your view of
the appropriateness of the activity. The boxes range from "1" for strongly disagree to "5"
for strongly agree:
1. It is acceptable for a law professor to use more expensive express mail for letters as
opposed to regular mail even if there is no need to rush delivery. (1.0)
2. A law professor should be permitted to use state funding to attend a meeting or
conference even if the purpose of the travel is primarily social. (1.2)
3. It is acceptable for a law professor to teach with less rigor in order to avoid poor
evaluations by students even it means the teaching is less effective. (1.0)
4. When deciding on whom to hire or to retain, a law professor should be able to consider
the impact of that decision on his or her personal friendship with the person under
consideration. (1.3)
5. It is acceptable for law professors to teach in a manner that promotes his or her own
political views and makes students reluctant to disagree. (1.0)
6. Law professors should be permitted to teach courses they find interesting even if other
courses are more useful to the students. (1.2)
7. It is acceptable for law professors not to attempt to discourage colleagues from the above
activities. (1.5)
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Both "petty crimes" and "institution-affecting" shirking can be so
widespread that they are best viewed as institutional norms. In other
words, the practices occur more than occasionally and are not questioned
when they do occur. 6 At this point, it may be more accurate to call it
institutional shirking because the practices are elevated to the status of
acceptable behavior. An institutional norm of "petty crimes" is a problem
much like widespread shop-lifting or skimming would be. The impact is to
make the institution less effective for the funds invested. Far more serious
are the institution-affecting norms. In these instances, not only is the
stakeholder's investment taken, but it is then used against stakeholder-
preferred outcomes.
A number of qualifications are in order here. First, I do not mean to
suggest that the lines between petty crimes and institution-affecting
shirking are clearly drawn. No doubt there is significant overlap. Second,
a good law school has representatives from a diversity of personalities and
views. Clearly, it is not shirking to express one's views when it adds to a
mix that is ultimately beneficial to the students. On the other hand,
decisions driven by personal greed or comfort are easily off-limits.
Similarly, promoting one's political views while opposing a more diverse
set of views also seems out of bounds. Third, there is no evidence - nor
do I intend to suggest - that law professors are any more personally
flawed than anyone else, at least until they enter the profession. Nor do I
mean to suggest that shirking is uniform across law professors. Balancing
personal preferences and institutional obligations is a struggle affecting
most law professors. When this struggle is successful, institutional norms
may evolve that are roughly consistent with those of stakeholders. The
struggle is lost and the balance upset, however, when professors begin to
think and act as though there is no separation between themselves and
stakeholders. Before ending this discussion of shirking and examining
capture, there are two final issues that may need clarification. The first is
one of the conundrums the process of defining ethical standards and
identifying shirking gives rise to. Consider two professors. Professor A
goes home at 6:00PM every night in order to eat dinner with her family and
does no work at home because she enjoys watching sports on TV. These
things are in her utility function. If she stayed at work until 9:00PM, she
could easily write one more article per year and her law school would
benefit both by her increase in knowledge, the service provided to the legal
community, and recognition of the school generally.
Professor B is not much different than Professor A except in one
important respect. She regularly socializes with faculty colleagues and
their friendship is important to her. Over the years, some of those
26. Perhaps a good test is the response one would get if he or she raised mention to a
member of the relevant faculty. A shrug or a statement like "that's just normal for us" is an
indication that the practice has reached norm level.
2005]
406 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCYLA WREVIEW [Vol. 82:397
colleagues have been considered for tenure. Professor B readily admits
that a few of them have not been very good scholars and has refused to
review their work, but remains silent because she values their friendship
and the friendship of those who support those candidates. Those
friendships are in her utility function.
Both professors have within their utility functions preferences that
conflict with advancing the interests of the law school. My impression is
that most readers will regard Professor A as acting reasonably and
Professor B as acting selfishly or even unprofessionally. If the hypothetical
is changed so that Professor B works until 9:00 every night in order to
offset the negative impact of her social preferences with increased
scholarly productivity, the question is whether there is a principled
distinction between Professors A and B. In effect, both have made the
same net contribution to the institution.
At least in the context of this essay, the issue of shirking is not a
matter of net contribution. Highly productive people can be monumental
shirkers while those less productive may be deeply loyal to stakeholders.
To allow net productivity to be the shirking standard would be to introduce
an element of utilitarianism into what is, at least for the purposes here, a
question of personal ethics and how one defines his or her rights. Professor
B has engaged in what is very similar to an attorney who makes use of a
client's funds and then reimburses the client, perhaps even with interest.27
This is an ethical violation because the attorney uses his or her power to
create a forced loan without consent and puts the assets of the client at risk.
It is this notion of using or exploiting others to further one's own ends that
is the essence of the ethical question in this essay.
The second clarification concerns the issue of whether less shirking or
a greater sense of duty to stakeholders can be equated with being a less
selfish and, presumably, more moral person. Some economists as well as
others either believe or assume that any seemingly selfless acts are simply
the result of personal preferences. In the context of law professors orjudges, for example, actions that seem not to be self-interested actually are
no less self-interested than any others. It just happens that the professor orjudge actually experiences greater utility by taking that action. Judge
Richard Posner has referred to these people as "'ordinary' human
beings." 29 Others believe that people are capable of what Amartya Sen
calls "counter-preferential choice.",3' These individuals are actually able to
act outside the constraints of their utility functions and act "selflessly." At
least for the purposes of this essay, I do not believe this distinction is an
27. MODEL RULES Of PROF' CONDUCT R. 1.15 (2003).
28. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market illusions: The Limits of
Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1309 (1986).
29. Posner, supra note 15, at 14.
30. Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. Arr. 317, 328 (1977).
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important one. For example, the non-shirking professor may be acting in
accord with a utility function that includes a preference for acting in a way
that will benefit others or may be a person who chooses to act counter-
preferentially out of a sense of duty.
D. Capture
As noted already, there may be a point at which "petty crimes" or
"institution-affecting" shirking is widespread enough that they become
institutional norms. The second general concept that is relevant here is the
notion of capture. Here I use the term "capture" to describe something that
falls between self-regulation and regulatory capture. In the more typical
case of regulatory capture, one thinks in terms of an administrative agency
that enacts rules that generally promote the interests of those in the agency
and those regulated over those the agency is expected to protect.
Regulating bodies can be captured when those regulated have power to
affect the welfare of those doing the regulating. This power can take a
variety of forms. For example, in some instances the regulators are
dependent on those regulated for information or financial support.
Sometimes those regulated have input about who the regulators will be.
Influences may be more informal. Regulators and those regulated may live
in the same communities, go to the same churches, or share other interests.
The crucial point is that pleasing those who are regulated worms its way
into the utility function of those who are asked to regulate.
The pattern of law faculty may seem to fit the idea of self-regulation.
After all, law professors create the rules that govern their own behavior. In
fact, one may view self-regulation as the ultimate form of capture. Still, I
think the better analogy is to the notion of capture because the law schools
do exist apart from the faculty and, as institutions in an ideal setting, have
objectives that are not fully consistent with those of the faculty. The
question is whether the institution itself is captured for the benefit of the
faculty. In fact, the idea of capture in this sense is turned around. It is not
capture where those regulated capture the regulatory officials. Instead, it is
capture whereby employees capture the institution for their independent
ends.
The relationship of shirking to capture may be obvious from the
discussion above. Shirking can take place on an individualized or "micro"
level. When it becomes a community norm and the members of that
community are consistently and effectively placing personal interests ahead
of the stakeholders that fund the institution, they have, in effect, captured it.
The critical question is whether members of a community will turn a blind
eye to the shirking of others and whether this log-rolling 31 is sufficiently
31. "Log-rolling" is the practice of trading favors. For example, I may be indifferent
to whether a certain person is hired but vote for that person because it will please a
colleague. In turn, my colleague may be indifferent to whether a course I would like to
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pervasive to make it too costly or impossible for others to correct. Clearly,
once established, the prospects for "freeing" the institution are slim. In
fact, for capture to be fully effective there must be means for resisting
reform efforts that may come from within or outside. Resistance to outside
efforts may take the form of self-promotion and claims that reform efforts
are inconsistent with academic freedom. Insider efforts would come from
new or veteran faculty. New faculty who have non-shirking ideals are
likely to be untenured and wary of appearing to be reformers. Reform
efforts of more veteran faculty can be dealt with in more subtle ways
including invoking various collegiality norms that have the impact of
curbing debate or delegitimizing efforts to reach outside the institution for
help.
In sum, there are a number ways in which law faculty may capture an
institution and engage in behavior that is inconsistent with stakeholder
interests. This is not to say it goes on. For example, law faculty may
simply commit themselves to the priority of stakeholders. In addition, it
may be that self-correcting mechanisms are in play that prevent capture.
This raises the issue of whether the institutional characteristics of law
schools actually invite and facilitate capture.
II. LAW SCHOOL VULNERABILITY
The baseline requirement for shirking to take place is, like many
things, that it results in higher benefits than costs. This is not to say that
individuals engage in a careful cost-benefit analysis of their actions but, for
the most part, people shirk because it is better for them than the alternative.
Drawing from the criminal law analogy, shirking is most likely to be
beneficial when the expected negative consequences are low or negative.32
Expected negative consequences are low when the shirking behavior is
unlikely to be "detected" and the punishment is low. Conversely, shirking
is low when accountability is high.33 As an example, consider a cashier at a
fast food restaurant who must account for all food sold and money in the
cash register at the end of the day or lose his or her job. Here the
probability of detection is high and the sanction is severe. Consequently,
the incidence of shirking is low. In fact, employers often use sophisticated
teach is part of the curriculum but votes for the course in return for my favor. The problem
in the academic setting was noted in 1776 by Adam Smith who wrote that the professors at
Oxford "'make a common cause, to be all very indulgent to one another, and every man to
consent that his neighbor may neglect his duty, provided he himself is permitted to neglect
his own."' ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONs 350 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House
1994) (1776), cited in The Ethics of Peer Review, supra note 9, at 254-55.
32. The analogy here is to punitive damages and criminal sanctions.
33. See The Ethics of Peer Review, supra note 9, at 229. ("In order to maintain the
social compact and its autonomy, a profession must both develop clear principles of
professional conduct and hold members of the profession accountable for meeting the
principles.").
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techniques to discover and discourage shirking. On the other hand, when
shirking is hard to detect or even part of normal behavior and there is no
punishment for the shirker, the incidence is likely to be high. Law schools
fit this latter description.
One can understand the vulnerability of law schools to shirking by
first thinking in terms of higher education generally. Without clear
standards for performance, the expected consequences are low because it is
exceedingly difficult to determine with precision whether shirking has
occurred. In higher education generally, it is difficult to assess the quantity
or quality of output. There are many imperfect measures like the number
of graduates or expenditures per graduate or percentage placement.
Ultimately, a faculty member's contribution to the function of the
institution is assessed in terms of teaching, research, and service. Of
course, none of these is subject to an objective standard. The subjectivity
involved in evaluation leaves huge gaps for interpretation by faculty
committees and self-promotion by individual faculty.
Law schools, of course, are subject to this higher-education
subjectivity and the lack of accountability that follows, but it goes further.
Even at the level of the most fundamental activities - teaching and
research - the detection of shirking is extremely difficult and the expected
costs low. In the case of scholarship, most law faculty have professional
degrees and have spent little time around professors engaged in
scholarship. The socialization that takes place in virtually every other
academic context is simply absent in law schools. In effect, scholarship is
part of on-the-job training for law professors, and the process does not
result in what most disciplines would regard as scholarship. Rather than
adhere to the Scientific Method as a means of searching for "truths" and
which would allow peer review of methodology, law professors are more
likely to identify an ill in society and expose it or write to promote a
particular political point of view. In effect, it is difficult to assess the
methodologies that law professors employ or the accuracy of their
"findings."
As a substitute for objective standards, to a significant degree the
perceived contribution of a faculty member is dependent upon the ranking
of the law review in which the scholarship is published. These placement
decisions are based, however, on the judgments of second and third year
students. In addition, the huge number of reviews virtually assures that
every article is published somewhere. This is in stark contrast to most
other areas in which the demand for articles is considerably lower and the
review process is conducted by experts.
One argument is that the review process of law professors comes at
the "back end" in the sense that peer review does take place at the time of
the tenure and promotion decision. This is accurate in a sense but, at most,
peer review of scholarship takes place once or twice in a law professor's
career - not with each article or book published. In addition, the peer
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review process of law professors is subject to bias and manipulation. As
already noted, law professors often write what amount to expanded briefs
in support of one position or another. When these articles are reviewed by
those sharing the views expressed by the author, it is very unusual to
receive a negative review. When candidates or their friends on a faculty
have a role in selecting reviewers, the probability of a disinterested review
declines further. Finally, the law teaching community is a relatively small
one; when considered by specialty, the communities are even smaller and
often focus on social and political positions as opposed to traditional fields
of research. This makes negative reviews even more difficult to write for a
reviewer who is likely to cross paths with the person reviewed for years to
come at conferences and meetings. In effect, there are few measures of
scholarly productivity and little incentive (and actual disincentive) for peers
to write painstaking reviews.
This all can lead to an intensely incestuous process of which the
following can occur. Professor A decides to contact several professors and
ask them to write articles on a topic and they all do. There is no peer or
even student review of the articles at any time before publication. One of
the professors asked is a colleague of the professor forming up the project.
The project is then executed and eventually the collection is printed as a
symposium by a middle or lower ranked law review or university press.
The organizer then congratulates the writer of the essay for having had the
article published and, as likely as not, sits on a committee that determines
whether the writer will be promoted.
The futility of establishing objective standards is exacerbated by the
variety of ways law professors express themselves. Accepted forms of
scholarship include articles, books, casebooks, treatises, edited books of
essays by others and, sometimes, teaching materials. It is difficult enough
to make qualitative assessments within each group and impossible to make
reliable cross-category assessments.
In the area of teaching, objectivity is also difficult. The most basic
quantitative measure - number of students times credit hours - rewards
those with large classes. But the ironic danger here is that a large class can
be a sign of a lack of rigor and possible shirking. Plus, small classes
dealing with difficult material may take more preparation by the professor
than large ones. Qualitative measures are also problematic. Class
visitations by peers mean that the professor is seen infrequently and only
on his or her best days. Student evaluations may measure effectiveness or
popularity. With the possible exception of actually holding class as
scheduled and posting regular office hours, there appear to be few ways to
establish accountability in teaching.
Beyond the bedrock functions of teaching and research are activities
that in many respects may be more important. Voting on hiring, retention,
and curricular matters have greater potential for shirking than individual
diligence with respect to teaching and research. A faculty that allows
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personal friendships to influence tenure votes is essentially doing the same
thing as an attorney using the client's funds or a company director
feathering his or her nest at the expense of shareholders. Yet, the law
professor version of this type of shirking is immune to outside assessment.
Similarly, faculty decisions to offer certain courses and not others, to
promote a particular point of view, to discourage dissent, or to operate
specific programs or centers that interest them but do not accrue to the
benefit of tax or tuition payers are even less detectable than poor teaching
and scholarship.
Having standards of performance and an ability to detect deviation is
but one element of the consequence analysis. The other is the sanction
itself. As a general matter, there are few meaningful sanctions for tenured
faculty. Denying tenure is not realistic except for the most egregious
conduct. Withholding pay raises could be an effective sanction if there
were standards and sufficient salary increase potential to make a significant
difference but, in fact, salary increase possibilities at most law schools are
relatively modest.
The expected consequences of shirking at law schools are low, but
that may be only half the story. If shirking is the norm, then there actually
may be sanctions for not shirking. Not shirking can take two forms. One is
simply to attempt to make judgments about the use of law school resources
that are consistent with the interests of stakeholders, whether tax or tuition
payers. In a zero-sum context, however, not engaging in advantage-taking
behavior can render one worse off than he or she would be if surrounded by
like-minded people.
Of greater concern is the plight of the non-shirker who believes there
is a moral and professional obligation to alter the direction of the
community.34 For example, this person might speak up at a committee
meeting on tenure and promotion in which favorable review letters have
been purposely solicited. Similarly, he or she might challenge the
legitimacy of programs that are not in the interest of stakeholders. No less
than the whistle-blower in any other context, the law professor can expect
his or her behavior to be sanctioned. This sanction can take a variety of
forms. Social exclusion is one. Another is exclusion from law school
programs like symposia and foreign teaching opportunities where there is a
single person or a small group controlling the activity. In addition, the non-
shirker in a context in which shirking is the norm may be the subject of
negative reference letters that may hamper opportunities at other
institutions.
34. This has been termed "ethical activism." Jonathan Knight & Carol J. Auster,
Faculty Conduct: A Study of Ethical Activism, 70 J. HIGHER EDUC. 188 (1999).
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The most pervasive of the sanctions is labeling the non-shirker
"uncollegial.",35 Civility standards in the sense of requiring "polite" - as
opposed to honest or ethical - behavior are rarely applied to people with
whom someone else agrees. They do tend to be applied to faculty who do
not place the institutional interests above those of a majority of the faculty 6
or who rebel against administrators who facilitate capture.37 In effect,
collegiality issues are often about the substance of speech as opposed to its
manner. By claiming that the non-shirking person is uncollegial or a hot-
head, the majority is able to rationalize ignoring the substance of the
claims. Going outside the captive law school is regarded as particularly
unacceptable-even though it may be the only way to achieve the type of
scrutiny that can lead to protecting stakeholder interests. In effect, civility,
collegiality, and etiquette standards can be a way to silence dissenters and
seal the institution against outside scrutiny.39 Even well-meaning people
who apply these standards tend to view the faculty as the institution and
ignore those for whom the institution exists. These dangers are recognized
by the American Association of Law Professor's Committee on Academic
Freedom and Tenure when it observes, "[h]istorically, 'collegiality' has not
infrequently been associated with ensuring homogeneity, and hence with
practices that exclude persons on the basis of their difference from a
perceived norm.' 4°
A lack of standards and the means of silencing those who disagree
make law schools vulnerable to shirking and eventually capture. A further
factor is the training of law professors. Most are trained in one form or
another of advocacy. All are capable of interpreting rules and events in a
wide variety of ways. In effect, just as they have used those skills to
advocate the interests of clients before entering law teaching, they can
begin to represent themselves in the context of the law school.
The lack of objective measures of success and the susceptibility of
evaluative systems to manipulation might not lead to capture if there were
some overriding authority that were willing and able to intervene. To the
outside world, the idea of a law school dean suggests that this power exists
in that office. Law professors and law school deans know the truth on this.
Deans typically serve at the pleasure of the faculty, and a dean who
35. Ironically, one advocate of greater collegiality invokes the image of Nazis in
describing those who he views as uncollegial faculty - a minority - that will not
compromise with the ruling majority. Michael L. Seigel, On Collegiality, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 406, 407 (2004).
36. Id.at4ll.
37. Id. at 413.
38. Id. at415.
39. See Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar
Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 657 (1994).
40. American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, On Collegiality as a Criterion for Faculty
Evaluation, at http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/collegia.htm (last visited May 4,
2005).
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attempts to identify meaningful standards or require adherence to fair
processes is likely to be a short-term dean unless those norms already exist.
Indeed, to the extent a dean sees his or her role as "serving the faculty" or
as an "agent of the faculty" as opposed to an agent of the stakeholders, the
principal-agent problem repeats itself and the dean becomes an instrument
of capture. The need to be responsive to faculty goals is exacerbated by the
fact that many deans are not significantly engaged in scholarship.4'
Obviously, they are individuals who find administrative work more
attractive than scholarship. For these individuals, the decision to take an
administrative career path is not one that can be easily reversed. Thus, the
most important goal, like that of elected politicians,42 is to maintain the
administrative post by pleasing those who can effectively dismiss an
uncooperative dean.
III. ARE LAW SCHOOLS CAPTURED?
I have attempted to explain what shirking and capture would look like
in the law school context. In addition, I have argued that law schools are
characterized by institutional factors that make them uniquely vulnerable to
capture by self-interested faculty and administrators. If conditions are
perfect for shirking and capture, does this mean that law schools are
captured and operated in a manner that is contrary to the interests of
stakeholders? Not necessarily.
A great deal of evidence in the field of behavioral economics suggests
that people do not act for maximum personal advantage.43 Moreover, the
level of shirking may vary with the aspirations of a specific law school
community. At very highly ranked schools, poor scholarship may elicit a
more negative reaction that it would at a middle or low ranked schools
simply because the production of high quality scholarship is part of the
culture, and faculty derive significant personal satisfaction from the
reputation of the school. Similarly, schools may take pride in their
reputations for emphasis on teaching excellence. In both of these cases, the
utility of each faculty member may be bound up in the reputation of the
school and there is a coincidence of faculty and stakeholder interests. This
does not mean faculty are any less self-interested.
It would be ideal to examine whether shirking - individually or
institutionally - actually does exist. Ironically, the same factor - the
impossibility of accountability - that makes shirking beneficial also
makes it impossible to assess the level of shirking directly. The question
41. In order to test this assertion, I examined the scholarship of the deans of schools
ranked 40-49 in 2005 by U.S. News and World Report. Of these ten deans, and putting
aside forwards to symposia, in-memorial articles, and the like, six had zero or one article
listed in the past five years in Westlaw.
42. Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118
HARv. L. REv. 915, 929 (2005).
43. See Harrison, supra note 28.
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can only be addressed somewhat obliquely. From that perspective there is
empirical, general, and anecdotal evidence of shirking and capture. All of
it is indirect and subject to interpretation. Reasonable people can disagree
about just how compelling the evidence is.
A. Empirical Evidence
Serious empirical examination of faculty ethics is a relatively new and
infrequent occurrence. 44 The surveys that do exist have not focused on law
professors. Whether inferences about law professors can be made from
these studies depends on one's perspective. Much of the forgoing material
suggests that law schools may be more vulnerable to shirking and capture
than other university components. On the other hand, virtually all law
professors come to teaching from a profession that requires knowledge of
what is considered ethical behavior. This may mean that law professors are
more sensitive to ethical issues than the general population of professors.
Perhaps the most ambitious survey of faculty ethics was conducted by
Jonathan Knight and Carol Auster.45 Knight and Auster focused on the
specific question of "ethical activism" or the reaction of faculty to reports
of the unethical conduct of colleagues. The reactions considered in their
survey were talking directly to the colleague or taking the matter up with an
administrative officer. As a general matter, about half of those approached,
either by a student or a faculty member, about the unethical conduct of
another faculty member spoke to the accused faculty member. 6 Women
were less likely to be ethically active than men. 7 In addition, faculty with
less seniority or of lower rank were less likely to be ethically active."
Interestingly, the likelihood of ethical activism was unrelated to the
seriousness of the conduct reported.49
Upon first impression, the Knight and Auster results appear to be a
case of half full/half empty. Is the picture gloomy because half of the
faculty reporting did nothing regardless of the seriousness of the complaint,
or is it bright because half of those reporting did react? In fact, the picture
is gloomy because the study almost certainly overstates the incidence of
ethical activism. There are two problems. First is the risk that those
surveyed did not provide accurate answers. In a sense, there are "right"
44. A 1993 examination of the literature found only scant evidence of any study of
faculty ethics. See James Steve Counelis, Toward Empirical Studies of Faculty Ethics: A
New Role for Institutional Research, 84 J. IIGHER EDUc. 74, 75-77 (1993). For a more
recent examination of misconduct in the context of teaching undergraduates, see JOHN M.
BRAXTON & ALAN E. BAYER, FACULTY MISCONDUCT IN COLLEGIATE TEACHING (1999).
45. Jonathan Knight & Carol J. Auster, Faculty Conduct: An Empirical Study of
EthicalActivism, 70 J. HIGHER EDuc. 188 (1999).
46. Id. at 197.
47. Id. at 199.
48. Id. at 199.
49. Id. at 200.
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answers in the survey. Most would agree that it is better to be ethically
involved, and this can lead to an overstatement. A bigger problem is the
fact that the survey only asks about those instances in which there is some
level of accountability. The faculty member hearing a complaint knows
that at least one other party knows that he or she knows and that that party
may complain to others. The inaction by the faculty member could lead to
embarrassment or even challenge on ethical grounds. In effect, the survey
focuses on instances in which there may be strictly self-serving reasons to
act ethically. On the other hand, reporting on a colleague is likely to be a
more difficult way to behave ethically than simply observing standards of
ethical conduct oneself.
The Knight and Auster study tells us that approximately half of those
surveyed turn a blind eye to reports of the unethical conduct of others
regardless of how serious the conduct and in circumstances in which their
indifference may be exposed. It is powerful evidence of shirking. What it
does not address is the question of capture or the development of a
"shirking norm" within a specific academic community.
B. Faculty Retention
A possible insight into capture was discovered by accident and in the
context of what may be the most serious challenge to faculty ethics -
retention decisions. In this context, a faculty member whose vote is
influenced by anything other than the merits of a candidate with respect to
the interests of stakeholders is analogous to an attorney not simply using
the funds of a client but taking them. The evidence of this was discovered
while engaged in an empirical study of the career paths of law teachers.
My objective was to study employment patterns and what kinds of factors
determined the movement of faculty from one school to another.
In order to conduct the study, I determined which individuals were
beginning law teachers in 1995 in the Association of American Law
Schools ("AALS") Directory of Law Teachers. I looked for the same
names in the AALS Directory of Law Teachers for 2003-2004. My naive
expectation was that some individuals would no longer be teaching, some
would be at the schools they started at, and still others would have moved
to higher or lower ranked schools as the market assessed their success. The
theory was to check these movements against publications, school of
graduation, teaching areas, and other factors that might explain movement.
I ended my examination prematurely after only making it to the E's in
the AALS Directories. By that time I had identified sixty-five new
teachers. By 2003-2004, eleven of those in the original group were no
longer listed in the Directory. This effectively reduced my sample to fifty-
five. Fourteen of the group of fifty-five were at different law schools, but
only four of those could be viewed as having moved up. If this sample was
representative, and I assumed it was, my study was destined to be a failure
since I was likely to find no more than ten or twelve candidates who had
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moved to higher-ranked schools - hardly the basis for reliable
determinants of movement.50 In addition, thirty-nine were graduates of
elite law schools - twenty-five from Harvard or Yale. In short, the idea of
comparing movement on the basis of a variety of factors could not work in
a population in which there was little movement and when one of my
determinative or independent variables (law school of graduation) also
showed little variation.
The lack of movement surprised me. Forty of the beginners had not
risen in the law school ranks nor fallen. In effect, almost 80% of those
hired were just where they started. To be more specific, approximately
80% of those hired had not received offers that they had found attractive
from other schools. At the same time, the schools that hired them
essentially affirmed their initial judgments by offering them life-time
contracts. What makes it more perplexing is that this occurred in a market
in which information about faculty productivity is readily available. After
all, perhaps the most important element of a professor's productivity is on
display to all in the form of publication. In addition, at the time of tenure,
the scholarship of a faculty member is typically read by reviewers at other
schools. Moreover, it seems safe to say that many law professors are not
shy when it comes to self-promotion. In sum, the lack of law professor
movement cannot be attributed to information problems.
How is it possible that 80% of the time schools hire people who they
then determine are valuable enough to deserve life-time appointments are
evidently not valuable, as a general matter, to other schools? Put
differently, why do so many hiring decisions turn out to be "just right"?"'
There are a number of possible explanations. One is that law school hiring
committees individually are amazingly insightful. Given the imperfect
information available about each applicant at the time of hiring, this is
unlikely.
Other explanations seem more accurate and deal with institution-wide
shirking. First, consider the question posed at the time of tenure
considerations. The question is not whether a life-time commitment to the
candidate is in the best interest of stakeholders. That would involve at least
a modicum of comparing the candidate with other candidates. If the
interests of the stakeholders - tax or tuition payers - were considered
first, the risk of a life-time employment contract would be weighed against
what might be available in the market. Instead, the question is whether the
50. Alternatively, I would have had to conduct the same exercise for several additional
years of new teachers.
51. As noted, fourteen of the beginners were not found in law teaching eight years
later. Some were probably tenure denials and this would offset the "exactly right"
conclusion. On the other hand, it seems just as likely that the departures were at the
initiative of the professor. In these instances, they may have been tenured and still be at the
hiring institution. Because I could not confirm these either way, this group played no role in
the analysis.
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individual has passed a test and found to be "qualified." In effect, in the
context of managing a stock portfolio, this would be like asking whether to
keep a stock without examining the market to determine its performance
against others. The way the life-time employment decision is framed
appears to be more consistent with protecting incumbent faculty than with
serving stakeholders. It subordinates the interests of the stakeholders and
allows faculty to avoid the social awkwardness of making hard decisions
about people they may have become friends with over the preceding six
years.
Aside from framing the question in a manner that protects incumbents,
the system is subject to individualized forms of manipulation.
Unfortunately, it is necessary here to rely on anecdotes,52 of which there are
many. I have observed or have had examples of manipulation reported to
me. A typical form of manipulation takes place in the selection of those
individuals asked to review the scholarship of a tenure candidate. 3
Reviewers in the candidate's area of expertise are sought from inside the
school and from outside.54 Members of the selection committee may take
the role of advocates of a particular or all candidates, and attempt to
identify readers who are likely to produce positive reviews. 55  This
advocacy results in the selection of "friends" of two types. Some friends
are friends in the traditional sense. Falling into this category may be
former professors and current official and unofficial mentors. The
selection of a friend/reviewer from inside the institution puts enormous
pressure on the reviewer to produce a positive review.
Political friends are those who are likely to agree with the basic
position in the candidate's scholarship. As already noted, the scholarship
of law professors often takes the form of advocacy. In these instances the
selection of reviewers can be a delicate matter. A reviewer who does not
share the position of the candidate may find fault with the work while the
political friend may be willing to overlook shortcomings as a means of
52. It would be ideal to compare the productivity of law faculties in the context of no
manipulation to protect incumbents with contexts in which there is manipulation. A
controlled experiment of this nature is impossible. One could approach the question in
reverse and attempt to characterize the hiring and tenure process at schools where the
faculty are known to be productive with that at schools with less productive faculty.
53. A colleague at another school provides this anecdote. While serving on a tenure
and promotion committee and selecting reviewers, he suggested an expert in the candidate's
field. The proposal was rejected because it was found that the candidate and potential
reviewer had discussed the topic over lunch before the article to be reviewed was written.
The next year, the same committee with the same composition minus the colleague selected
a reviewer for a candidate who was not an expert in the candidate's field, and even though
the reviewer revealed that he had spent hours with the candidate discussing the topic.
54. Among the requirements of the "Good Practices" Statement is a willingness to
serve as an evaluator of scholarship. See supra note 5.
55. It is also possible to attempt to identify those likely to write negative reviews, but I
have not personally seen this.
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insuring that a political ally will continue in the profession. My
experience and that of colleagues at other schools suggests it is rare that a
committee selects in advance a reviewer known to oppose the position of
the candidate. Far more frequent is the selection of "political friends." For
example, in the hundreds of scholarship review letters I have read, I do not
recall seeing a negative review by an environmentalist of an article by an
environmentalist, by a child advocate of an article by a child advocate, by
an ADR advocate of an article by another ADR advocate, or of any article
in a politically sensitive area when the reviewer shares the same political
philosophy. I am sure these letters must exist, but my sense is that they are
rare. Yet it does not seem possible that the quality of one's research and
writing is dependent on sharing the political perspective of the reviewer.
In most instances, faculties meet to consider the evaluation letters and
consider the recommendation of a committee. It is in the context of a
faculty meeting that capture can be most evident. The manipulation in the
context of a meeting can take the form of discounting some facts and
emphasizing others. For example, in a recent meeting a faculty considered
the record of a tenure candidate that included a negative letter from a
neutral expert in the field. The expert pointed out that the candidate had
inflated the appearance of the work done by recycling the same ideas
throughout a number of articles. A faculty member studied the question
and found that 30% of the work was actually recycled. The revelation was
met by anger and then silence as the candidate was already socially
entrenched in the faculty.
C. Hubris
Evidence of shirking and institution-wide acceptance of shirking
comes from a fascinating study of decision-making by judges conducted by
Professor Tracey George.56 Professor George examined the variables that
were correlated with a number of factors including how ideological ajudge's decision-making was. 7 The basic measure of ideological voting
was how much the judge did or did not stray from the ideology of the
President appointing him or her. One could see this as a test of whether,
when one becomes a judge, he or she accepts the role of deciding cases on
the basis of neutral principles or approaches the job from the perspective
that he or she "knows best." Professor George found that full-time law
professors who were appointed to the bench were, in fact, more ideological
than non-law professor appointees.58
There may be explanations for this difference that are laudable rather
than troubling. For example, law professors may actually "know best" in
56. Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARiz. L. REv. 9 (2001). This connection was
brought to my attention by my colleague Amy Mashburn.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 43-59.
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the sense that they may have a broader vision and a greater appreciation for
the subtle theoretical underpinnings of the law. The problem is that the
propensity to vote more ideologically than non-academic judges was not
found just among liberal or conservative appointees. In other words, the
"knows best" explanation would mean that both sides of the political
spectrum "know best" and hold opposite views. In effect, without
question, law professors as judges more aggressively promote their views
of what the law should be and are more likely to depart from precedent.
If law professors/judges on both sides of the political spectrum are
equally confident that they are "right," the question in the context of this
essay is not who is right but what accounts for these attitudes and what it
tells us about shirking and capture. Put differently, when a judge is
appointed to the bench and arrives with an attitude that results in less
respect for precedent than other judges, can we draw any inferences about
the environment from which the judge came and his or her likely behavior
in that context? Certainly there is room for disagreement on how much can
be read into this, but there is little reason to expect that law professors who
become judges displayed different behavior when they were law
professors. In fact, as a judge, decisions are examined closely by peers and
subject to relatively public reversal. Certainly, the law school world is
more cloistered and the risks of scrutiny are significantly less. The point is
that if law professors as judges are willing to view themselves as apart from
and not answerable to others, it seems likely that they would display the
same level or a greater level of hubris in the context of a law school. Does
this equate to being unethical? Not necessarily, since a general focus on
one's own interests may not mean that interests of stakeholders are
subordinated. For example, a single-minded interest on scholarship in
hopes of job mobility may also benefit stakeholders. On the other hand,
stakeholder interests may have little chance of competing with more
personal ones.
D. Play the Ranking Game
More than an inference of shirking can be drawn from the reaction of
law schools to the recent efforts by U.S News & World Report and others to
rank law schools.59 In a recent article, Professor Dale Whitman identifies
practices that are deeply troubling. 60 For example, one of the factors that
determine a law school's rank is the percentage of applicants accepted -
59. One of the consequences is the time spent by professors monitoring their schools'
rank. It can become something of an obsession. At my school there is one professor who is
self-designed to determine whether there are any new rankings of any kind that are
indicative of our appearance to others. We get emails that say things like "Up from 55 to
53." Or "Down to 58 but that was before Jack's article was accepted by Harvard."
60. Whitman, supra note 2.
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the lower the better.6' Thus, one way to move up in the rankings is to
encourage applications even from those who the school knows ahead of
time will not qualify for admission. According to Professor Whitman, this
is a measure that one or more law schools have taken action to improve,
knowingly inflating their application figures by encouraging application by
those with little or no chance of admission. 62
Another factor in the U.S. News & World Report ranking is the
percentage of graduates employed after nine months.6  This has led to the
practice of locating unemployed graduates and offering them temporary
positions with the law school in order to be able to report a higher
percentage employed figure. Finally, and perhaps most tragically,
admissions decisions have been affected by efforts to move up in the
rankings. This is the result of the fact that the rankings are affected by the
grade point averages of students as well as LSAT scores.M When
examining these two criteria, a school may, and evidently does, 65 decide to
select applicants on the basis of which one will increase its score in the
category that will be most advantageous to the school's overall ranking.66
A further reaction is evident nearly every day at faculty mailboxes.
Not a day now goes by that my mailbox does not include a glossy brochure
telling me who is speaking at the University of Alabama, who is visiting at
the University of Tennessee or what the faculty at Florida State have
published. For example, on a single day last year, most of my colleagues
and I received four separate pieces of promotion mail. To be sure, this was
unusually high.67 Next to our mailbox there is a box for recycling and one
for garbage. When no one was looking, I gathered the discarded promotion
mail. Between the two boxes there were a total of ninety-five pieces of law
school promotional mail left unopened. Vast sums are spent on creating
61. U.S. News & World Report rankings of the top 100 law schools, available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankngs/law/brief/lawrank-briefphp (last visited
May 4, 2005).
62. Ironically, law school deans reject the US. News & World Report ranking at the
same time as legitimizing it by attempting to climb up the rankings. See Rena I. Steinzor &
Alan D. Hornstein, The Unplanned Obsolescence of American Legal Education, 75 TEMP.
L. REV. 447 (2002).
63. U.S. News & World Report rankings of the top 100 law schools, supra note 61.
64. Id.
65. According to Professor Whitman, the practices all did occur. Whitman, supra note
2.
66. A factor that enters into the rating is the student/faculty ratio. My own school's
contribution to ways to move up the rankings was allowing non-tenure track teachers to vote
on all but appointments and retention questions. This meant they could be counted as
faculty and allowed our faculty/student ratio to increase. The number of these people -
close to twenty - and the difference in their priorities compared to those of tenure-track
faculty means that the faculty potentially lost control of school policy for the benefit of a
possible modest move up in the rankings.
67. One professor reports receiving only twenty-six pieces in a month. Jay M.
Feiman, The Five-Dollar Solution, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 225 (2004).
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this illusion, but to what end? Most of the efforts of mid-level schools
involved in this promotional proliferation are simply off-setting each
other.68
How are these promotional efforts related to shirking and capture?
There are direct and indirect connections. First, it is important to note that
even though many of these measures are undertaken by the law school's
administration,69 it is very unlikely that a dean could ignore a faculty's
demand that the practices stop.70 Very clearly, faculty are complicit in the
effort. In fact, the faculty lounge at my school is filled with theories on
how to move up the rankings. For example, "[b]e sure to acknowledge
anyone you know at a top-ranked school in the introduction to your article
and then send them a reprint." Or, "[t]he next time you are asked to rank
the top twenty International Programs just list us - otherwise you are
giving credit to our rivals."
Unless playing the ranking game benefits stakeholders, there is
probably no better example of shirking and capture. Does it? It seems very
unlikely. First, it is not clear how moving up or down in any ranking
actually accrues to the benefit of the stakeholders. The principle possibility
is that the initial salaries of graduates may increase if a school moves up in
the rankings. This probably means little to future income possibilities as
actual performance is more likely to take over as the income-determining
factor. In addition, at a public school, the principal stakeholders are
taxpayers and higher initial incomes for attorneys seems unrelated to their
welfare and is actually counter to it. Furthermore, the connection between
increased promotional efforts and movement in the law school polls has not
been established at least as far as permitting a school to leap-frog enough
other schools to make a difference. Finally, even if market value made a
difference to stakeholders, there remains the question of whether the
increase is justified by the costs.
So, what motivates the investment in making a law school look better
without changing the substance of the school in a way that benefits
stakeholders? It seems likely that law school deans prefer to have a higher
rank than a lower one even if the only purposes are impressing university
presidents and attracting applicants. Moreover, as Professor Whitman
suggests, it is just as likely that the ranking game is more related to
68. Participation may be necessary simply to hold one's place in the ranking. See
Joseph P. Tomain & Paul L. Caron, The Associate Dean for Faculty Research Position:
Encouraging and Promoting Scholarship, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 233,241-42 (2001).
69. Deans at mid-level schools do essentially what the faculty directs them to do.
Levinson, supra note 42, at 929; see also supra text accompanying note 42.
70. In the case of the example involving LSAT and grade point average, faculty
complicity is even more obvious since admissions committees are often composed of
faculty.
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"institutional and personal egos' 7' as much as to any sense the stakeholders
are better off.
This is actually a generous picture of the impact of the institutional
efforts at self-promotion. It presupposes that the rankings are expensive
but that the substance of the law school itself does not change. In fact, the
emphasis on rankings may influence how faculties choose to perform their
duties. For example, the reputation of a school is one of the factors
affecting the U.S. News & World Report ranking. The reputation of a law
school is based on tangible evidence of productivity as perceived by
outsiders. Clearly, this means research as opposed to teaching is a more
important factor. Thus, while the interests of the stakeholders may be best
advanced by one balance between teaching and research, the ranking may
be influenced by a different one. Similarly, it is doubtful that any ranking
has been influenced by time spent advising students or service-related
activities.
Less certain is the impact of the ranking game on the quality of faculty
publications. At least one possibility is that deans and those promoting law
schools desire more news and, thus, more reasons for announcements.
Here personal experience comes into play. My impression is that the
greater emphasis on institutional image over substance may have carried
over to scholarship. Those who publish shorter, possibly less substantive
and time-consuming articles will appear to be adding more to the status of
the school than those involved in longer efforts simply because they make
the faculty appear more ubiquitous.
A final concern is a more general reaction to the rankings. One
possibility is to view the ratings as exposing weaknesses in various
programs that could be addressed by improving law school programs. In
fact, the opposite seems to be true. Just as the shortcomings of law schools
may be exposed by various ratings, a massive campaign of advertising and
deceptions seems to have evolved,72 the purpose of which is to convince
others that law schools embrace and operate in a manner that is consistent
with stakeholder goals. At my school, and at others I am confident, the
need to look good has taken on an additional dimension. We have the
usual assortment of announcements and brochures that extol our
"publications" (with everything beyond an email regarded as a
publication), centers, and institutes, some of which are composed of one
person and a box of letterhead, etc. We are also encouraged to be named in
as many press reports as possible and have a staff member who keeps track
of our number of "hits."
71. Whitman, supra note 2.
72. There is also the possibility that some of the data is not reported accurately. Ted
Gest, Combating Legalese: Law Schools are Finally Learning that Good English Makes
Good Sense, U.S. NEWS & WOR.D REPORT, Mar. 20, 1995, at 82.
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The obsession with image is sometimes comical and involves "making
news" in the most literal sense in that events occur only because they can
be reported. Schools create centers, international study programs, hold
conferences and create awards with little or no thought to stakeholders.
Sometimes it reaches absurd proportions. For example, a recent press
release by one school announced that a faculty member had received a very
prestigious award (properly named to give that impression) recognizing
that faculty member's contribution in a particular field. Someone seeing
this from the outside would certainly be impressed. Scraping away the
surface, it seems significantly less impressive - even embarrassing. The
award had actually been created by the school itself and the recipient was a
close friend of the initiator, also a faculty member. In short, the award had
simply been declared to exist with no apparent institutional process other
than promotional. The publication of the event suggests that the
department making the award is of sufficient consequence that it should be
in the award-giving business. And, perhaps hardest to understand, the
award becomes a source of true feelings for the recipient and even part of
future claims of success by the school or department.
E. Addiction to Illusion
The final category of evidence is wholly anecdotal and based on
personal observation. It involves the inability of professors I have
observed to separate themselves from events in a way that allows them to
evaluate those events from an ego-free perspective. What I observe, or
think I observe, has a Matrix-like quality. For those of you who have not
seen the film, it portrays the battle between being "real" and feeling good.
In effect, machines have taken over the world and cultivate humans as an
energy source. They - the humans - actually grow in little pods. They
are content because whatever consciousness they have is simply the result
of a computerized reality.
Some humans are actually fighting for real reality even though it
means some unhappiness. The evil forces are those who want to perpetuate
the sense of well-being. Thus, the movie assumes, counter to what the
current demand for mood-altering drugs indicates, that we are instinctively
on the side of those who fight for the "real" reality. The movie skips over a
question that philosophers have addressed one way or another for years.
Are we actually on the side of the real? Descartes saw the issue as whether
our consciousness is imposed by some outside force or the result of our free
will.73  The idea is reflected in Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and
Utopia74 when he asks the question of whether we would willingly enter an
experience machine. In the machine everything is dandy, and you do not
73. RENA DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND THE MEDITATIONS (F.E. Sutcliffe
ed., 1968) (1641).
74. ROBERT NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974).
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recall that you opted into the machine. 75 Nozick makes the case that there
are reasons for not entering the machine.76
Many law professors I have observed seem to crave the painlessness
of the unreal world. In terms of the experience machine it amounts to a
preference for sensing that one is part of a productive endeavor over
actually being part of a productive endeavor. Having gone through the
contortions to change perceptions of themselves or their schools, they then
begin to take satisfaction from those appearances as though they were real.
In terms of the film, it is comparable to constructing the Matrix or Nozick's
experience machine and then happily jumping in. Obviously this pulls
them even further apart from stakeholders because institutional and
individual self-promotion measures divert effort from ones that are faithful
to stakeholders. The pull, however, seems irresistible to many. Indeed, the
unhappiest people I have known in the academic world are those who are
unable to suspend their disbelief sufficiently to enjoy the illusion.
It is this inability to see individual and institutional efforts from an
ego-free perspective that makes faculty governance especially dangerous.
Stakeholders are not simply subordinated, they are not part of the analysis
at all. Here are three anecdotes that serve as examples. In the preceding
section, I described the incident of the award given by one friend to another
for the purpose of creating news. I suggested it was another example of
institutional action designed to elevate the image of the school without
benefit to the stakeholders. Now consider that the recipient actually took
pleasure in receiving the award out of a sense that it was genuine
recognition. This raises the danger even further. It is one matter to dispute
faculty and institutional actions when perceptions are the same and quite
another when the need for illusion is powerful.7 7
A similar example was provided to me from a friend at another school.
His school has three programs through which students may study overseas.
Two or more professors travel with the students, but these programs had
come under increasing scrutiny due to their expense and low enrollments.
The programs were closely guarded by those who had founded them and
those who had participated. Eventually, in defense of them, a supporter
stated that the programs led to the preparation of "comparative law
materials." My friend who had taught in the program was dumbfounded
and consulted with others about whether they had prepared comparative
law materials. The answer was no. He reports that he asked the supporter
75. Id. at 42-43.
76. Id. at 43-45.
77. Another example involves those who teach in a department at my school. Their
program is ranked second nationally, a source of great pride and a ranking that is
aggressively protected. The ranking is posted on the faculty bulletin board. Two
qualifications are not permitted in the Matrix. One is that only a handful of competitors
exist. The second is that the ranking could well tumble if the faculty at any number of other
schools decided to band together and call themselves a "department."
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about the claim and the supporter became agitated but would not relent,
identifying a single instance in which one teacher had noted in a class
differing reactions of foreign and United States students to a common legal
problem. In effect, the claim had become entrenched in the supporter's
reality and any suggestion otherwise resulted in unacceptable dissonance.
The only of these anecdotes that is personal to me involves serving on
an appointments committee. Early in the year the dean visited the
committee to explain the hiring need for the year. Among them was "trusts
and estates," and another colleague and I were assigned to a subcommittee
to find qualified candidates. We promptly put the assignment aside.
Several months later the dean visited the committee again and expressed
disappointment that the committee had not yet found a trusts and estates
specialist. That night, I confided in my spouse that I felt guilty that my
colleague and I had failed our assignment. Indeed we had not even tried.
The next day, the dean visited the committee again, and the issue of the
trusts and estates position came up. I was feeling sheepish when my
colleague began speaking. He was red-faced and trembling with anger.
"I'll have you know," he informed the dean, "we have conducted a nation-
wide search. Based on that search there were simply no qualified
candidates in this field that we had a chance of attracting." There was no
question that my partner in neglect believed what he was saying. After the
meeting, I asked him what we had done. He reminded me that when we
received resumes that were mailed in by candidates, we had looked to see
if any of them taught trusts and estates. Our realities of what constituted
doing an acceptable job could not have been more different.
There are a number of clich6s for this - believing one's own press,
saying something does not mean it is true - and all counsel us to look at
things from a different perspective. As the Tracey George study strongly
suggests, the ability to view things from different perspectives is not the78
strong suit of law professors. The propensity to create a new reality is not
limited to law professors. An excellent example is the approach of students
to grading curves. At my law school the faculty recently enacted a 3.25
mandatory curve. An average grade is now a B+. The reality that actual
student performance is no different from their predecessors who made Cs is
irrelevant. If you get a B, you must be "above average" even though, as an
empirical matter, two-thirds of the class did even better than that. Unlike
the faculty, however, the students must deal with those who are not in on
the Matrix. Any employer with an ounce of sense will ignore the GPA and
look at class rank. Ultimately, the higher curve exists because it feels
better. It is evidently irrelevant that nothing actually is better.79
78. George, supra note 56, at 43-59; see also supra text following note 56.
79. Outside the world of the law school, the emphasis on form over substance is also
pervasive. In those contexts, however, it is more difficult to maintain the illusion because
there are constant reminders of what is real. For example, one enjoys the loss of twenty
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The empirical work discussed above along with law school retention
decisions, the attitudes of law professors appointed to the bench, the
generalized reaction to the ratings game and an overriding need to be
perceived as successful suggest that shirking and capture are at work in
legal education. This does not mean that every faculty member is involved
or that shirking at any one school rises to the level of capture. However,
any school that turns out to be "right" about who it hired nearly all the
time and engages in efforts to affect rankings that actually do not make the
school more responsive to stakeholders is probably fairly regarded as
captive.
IV. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS
It is impossible in the context of this essay to provide a standard by
which each school can be evaluated with respect to shirking and capture.
On the other hand, this essay argues that the conditions are close to perfect
for capture to occur and that there is substantial indirect evidence that
capture does exist. The question is whether this is enough to justify further
self-examination on a school-by-school basis. The answer to this is easy:
yes. If law schools were people who had genetic and environmental
propensities to contract a disease and there were symptoms, further testing
would certainly be advised. In more conventional contexts in which
conditions are such that corruption may occur and there are signs that it
does occur, audits are a normal course of business.
In the context of law schools, one may argue that the visit every seven
years by AALS and ABA accreditation teams are a form of audit. I trust
any law professor reading this will agree that those visits are not
comparable to an audit. Reports are prepared in advance by the school.
Those reports involve judgments that are likely to be influenced by all the
factors that make faculty governance itself questionable. Moreover, an
inspection is about meeting minimum standards, not whether the school
and faculty are acting in good faith to serve stakeholders.
Discussions of faculty governance are sensitive matters. No one likes
to have his or her good faith questioned. Faculties are sometimes
justifiably resistant to outside scrutiny because reasonable actions may
seem unreasonable when taken out of context and examined by the ill-
informed. Nevertheless, what is missing in the governance of law schools
is transparency and accountability. Obviously, these two complement each
other; a lack of transparency permits decision-makers to remain
unaccountable. In the context of law schools, this means the need to
involve stakeholders in the process in some form. The crucial task is to
change the culture of law faculties so that the following would routinely be
pounds by adjusting one's scales or takes pride in becoming a top-ranking sales person by
exaggerating sales figures on an accounting statement.
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asked: "Could this decision be explained, truthfully and fully, so that
stakeholders would believe it is in their best interest?"
Stakeholder participation would not, and from a practical standpoint
could not, involve participation in the day-to-day operation of a law school.
Nor should it involve an evaluation of individual faculty in any other
instance than when faculty also assesses individuals. Stakeholder
involvement should focus on the four major resource-affecting decisions
faculties make: hiring, tenure,80 curricular changes, and the establishment
of new programs or the expansion of existing programs.
Unfortunately, there are no public interest groups or watch dog
organizations that focus on the operation of law schools and, thus, represent
stakeholder interests. The impact of law school decisions are hardly
significant enough to attract that type of attention. Moreover, in the case of
public law schools, the idea that there is there some overriding control by
virtue of an elected legislature is unrealistic and a little bit frightening.
Thus, the public participation would have to be invited by law schools
themselves.
Precisely what form stakeholder participation should take is difficult
to say. The range includes actual voting on faculties and their
committees,81 a "notice and hearing" process, or the formation of an
independent compliance board that would assess the impact proposed by a
faculty decision.12 Perhaps it would vary depending on the issue. For
example, student and stakeholder involvement when interviewing new
candidates would be relatively easy to establish. In other instances, like the
establishment of a new program or curricular changes, the faculty decision
could be subject to a "Stakeholder Impact Statement" that would be
assessed by the compliance board. In all cases, but especially if a notice
and hearing approach were employed, the internet could greatly reduce
80. The tenure recommendations of law faculties are typically subject to review by
central campus committees and other boards. The effectiveness of these reviews is unclear.
In my personal experience I have not seen a law school decision reversed. In the case of a
university-wide committee, this may be accounted for by the same type of log-rolling that
affects law faculties.
81. At some schools, including my own, students already interview new candidates
and report to the faculty. Through teaching evaluations, they communicate on tenure and
promotion decisions.
82. One possibility is some form of public hearing including students when directly
relevant issues are involved. Practical limitations make it more difficult when a law school
is isolated geographically. For a discussion of the nature of participation at public hearing,
see Katherine A. McComas & Clifford W. Scherer, Reassessing Public Meetings as
Participation in Risk Management Decisions, 9 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT
347 (1998).
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participation costs. 83 The response could be advisory or binding. In all
cases, the outcome of all decisions should be public.
The actual form is less important than the most critical requirement
that the stakeholders act independently. Stakeholders should have no
professional or social connections - past, present, or anticipated - with
any member of the law school faculty. Independence also requires that any
review panel have information-gathering capacity. Reliance on the law
school itself is one way to encourage capture by that law school. Because
of the need for information and the high costs of independently generating
information, it may be advisable to appoint stakeholders with knowledge of
higher education and the issues that arise. If members of the panel are
appointed for staggered terms, continuity of membership would lower
information costs. In addition, there is no reason why one panel could not
serve all the needs of a number of law schools.
One concern about such a body is its lack of expertise. It is not
necessary that the public participants understand every facet of the
decision. The public's role is to assess the relationship of the decision to
stakeholder interests from the standpoint of procedural fairness and
common sense. In order to understand the possible influence of
independent stakeholders, consider the following proposals made at a
faculty meeting, first with faculty only present and then with stakeholder
representatives present.
1. A popular faculty member is proposed for tenure. His teaching
evaluations are good to average. His volume of scholarship is high. In the
file is a negative letter from a national expert asserting, correctly, that 30%
of the candidate's work is recycled from earlier work. After ten minutes of
laudatory commentary nothing has been said about the negative letter and
its claim.
2. Another popular candidate is proposed for tenure. She, her
husband, and their children are regulars at faculty social events. Dinner at
her house is always fun. Her teaching evaluations are average and class
visits reveal that she is, at best, an average teacher. In addition, even
though she has met the numerical requirements for number of articles to be
granted tenure, most of her writing came in the last year. Both of her last
two articles - one of which was a fifteen-page symposium piece she
submitted at the request of a friend - were in manuscript form when
evaluated.
3. Another candidate is proposed for tenure. He is not well-liked
principally because he has spoken out at faculty meetings, usually in favor
of a conservative position. He has written the required number of articles
83. Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public
Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L.
REV. 277, 334 (1998).
FACULTYETHICS INLA WSCHOOL
in a timely way. His teaching evaluations are above average. Unlike every
other candidate, there is no discussion of this one.
4. A faculty member travels to Italy where he has family members.
He proposes starting a summer program in Italy. None of the students at
your school speak Italian, the state has little trade with Italy, and United
States law would be taught at the summer school. At least two other
faculty would travel to Italy, at the school's expense, in order to do the
teaching.
5. A faculty committee has recommended that the law school initiate
a sabbatical program. Under the terms of the sabbatical, the faculty
member receives full pay and is not obligated to do any teaching, research,
or scholarship for a semester. In order to qualify for a sabbatical, a faculty
member must have been employed by the school for six years whether or
not engaged in full-time teaching or research.
6. A faculty committee recommends a summer research program.
Under the program, a faculty member receives summer pay to do research.
The faculty member is entitled to the summer pay whether or not any
research is actually conducted.
7. A law faculty teaches twelve credit hours per academic year. This
translates into six sixty-minute teaching hours per week. A faculty
committee proposes reducing the teaching load to nine credit hours per
academic year and reducing the class period to fifty minutes.
8. A wealthy graduate has contributed $1,000,000 to the school to
underwrite the establishment of a Chair in Property Law. A committee is
assigned to conduct a search and proposes Candidate B. B has co-authored
a couple of articles with the chair of the committee. B has not taught
Property nor published in the area. He does say he is willing to teach
Property if hired.
If you are on a law faculty, let's keep score. Imagine each situation in
the context of your faculty only and in the context of five voting
stakeholders. Give yourself zero points if the presence of stakeholders
would have no impact on your comments. Give yourself two points if the
presence of stakeholders would not alter your position but how you express
it. Give yourself four points if you would have decided not to say
something you would have said. If you think the presence of voting
stakeholders would have no impact on the final decision, give yourself zero
points. If you think the presence of voting stakeholders would lead to a
closer vote, give yourself two points. If you think the presence of voting
stakeholders would alter the vote or mean that the proposal would not be
made in the first place, give yourself six points.
Now add up the points. If your total is in excess of sixteen, you are
part of a captive faculty and should consider additional accountability and
transparency.
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